Friendship and the Comparison of Goods

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My concern in this paper is with the last sentence of VIII.1 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (EN). The correct understanding of that sentence has, I believe, significant philosophical implications. But I want to approach the philosophical issues cautiously, through a somewhat narrow textual question, viz. Was the sentence written by Aristotle? My contention is that it was, and, in order to establish this, I will first argue, negatively, that the linguistic arguments to the contrary have little force, and then positively, that the sentence does refer to an earlier passage in EN, namely, book I chapter 6. If this thesis is correct, then the argument of book I, and especially the opening of I.7, appears in a new light; furthermore, we are then provided with the key to understanding the nature of Aristotle's classification of friendship into three kinds.

Chapter 1 of book VIII of EN serves as an introduction to Aristotle's discussion of friendship. The first half of the chapter provides a series of reasons why friendship ought to be discussed in a treatise on ethics (1155a1-31); the second half briefly reviews some of the opinions of some of Aristotle's predecessors on the subject (1155a32-b16). This brief review generates some difficulties about friendship, and, as is common in Aristotle, the ensuing discussion is motivated by these difficulties. The chapter closes with parenthetical remarks of a logical character. I translate the end of the chapter, together with the opening sentence of chapter two:

Let us investigate instead <the difficulties which concern> what is distinctively human and which pertain to character and feelings. For example, Does friendship arise among all, or are bad men incapable of being friends?, and, Is there one kind [είδος] of friendship or more <than one>? Those who think that there is one kind, because friendship admits of more-and-less, have not relied upon an adequate sign. For things that differ in kind [τὰ ἔτροφα τῷ εἴδει] also admit of more-and-less. These things have been discussed earlier [εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν].

II. Perhaps we would get clear about these things [περὶ αὐτῶν] if what is loveable is distinguished.
The passage beginning “Those who think . . .” to the end of the chapter is evidently parenthetical, because the difficulties about friendship raised just before, at b11-13, are taken up at the beginning of chapter two, and the pronoun in περὶ αὐτῶν at b17 clearly refers back to these difficulties.

Now what is puzzling about these parenthetical remarks is that the logical issues they raise do not seem to have been discussed earlier in EN. Burnet’s comment on ἐμπόσσθεν is: “It is vain to ask where.” Aspasius conjectured that the reference was to lost portions of EN. Grant, who is followed by Stewart and Gauthier and Jolif, writes:

As there is no place in the Ethics where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast [sc. Aspasius] says with regard to the last words of the paragraph: ένωκε δὲ εἰρήσθη ἐν τοῖς ἑκπεπτωκόι τῶν Νικομαχεῖων. But most probably the words εἴρηται δ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of Eth. II.viii.5, . . .

Thus although several lines at the end of VIII.1 have a parenthetical character, the last line alone is taken to be spurious, on the grounds that there is no passage earlier in EN to which it might appropriately be taken to refer. Let us call this line of thought the argument from “vacuous reference” (VR). Consequently, if some passage can be found that does consider logical issues of the sort raised here, then this argument for the inauthenticity of b15-6 loses its force.

Linguistic arguments

Yet there are independent arguments for the inauthenticity of the passage that are linguistic in character. These arguments are typically marshalled as secondary or supporting reasons for considering the sentence spurious. But it is important to see that they have little force on their own and are incapable of supporting the conclusion of spuriousness apart from VR. One argument concerns the use of ὑπὲρ with the genitive in b16 in the sense of “concerning”; another concerns what might seem to be an awkwardness in the proximity of ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν and περὶ αὐτῶν at b16-7.

The argument based on the use of ὑπὲρ can be advanced with varying degrees of sophistication. The simplest is through guilt by association, so to speak, and runs as follows. In indisputably genuine works of Aristotle, ὑπὲρ is rarely used with the genitive and having the sense of “concerning”;

Aristotle typically uses περὶ with the genitive to mean “concerning”. In

1 In what follows, I shall use the abbreviation ’ὑπὲρ (= περὶ)’ to mean ‘ὑπὲρ used with the genitive having the sense of “concerning”, like περὶ’.
contrast, ὑπέρ (= περὶ) is common in the Magna Moralia and the Rhetoric to Alexander – both spurious works. Because, then, ὑπέρ (= περὶ) is rare in attested works and common in some spurious works, then – the argument runs – the occurrence of ὑπέρ in place of περὶ at b16 gives some support to the suggestion that the sentence is spurious. Thus Gauthier and Jolif, after remarking that the logical issues of b13-5 were not discussed earlier, comment that this problem, ajouté à l’emploi de ὑπέρ pour περὶ, exceptionnel dans la langue d’Aristote, cf. plus haut, comm. sur I,3, 1096a4, – a amené Grant, Ramsauer, Susemihl, Stewart à voir dans ces mots une glose inauthentique (peut-être insérée en mauvais place) (p. 669).

Mere infrequency, of course, cannot establish spuriousness. And, as Dirlmeier remarks (p. 512), that Aristotle might have used ὑπέρ for περὶ is settled by two occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περὶ) in Plato, at Apol. 39e1 and Legg. 776e7. But neither can it be maintained that the mere occurrence of ὑπέρ (= περὶ) in a sentence lends a degree of probability to the claim that the sentence is inauthentic. Although ὑπέρ (= περὶ) is indeed infrequent in authentic works,2 some of its occurrences are undoubtedly authentic. For example, although 6 of the 7 occurrences in the Categories are found in the clearly spurious bridge passage to the postpraedicamenta, 11b10-6, the other occurrence, at 11a20, is significant, since it is in the first person plural: 

Οὐ δεὶ δὲ παράττεσθαι μὴ τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπέρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένος πολλά τῶν πρὸς τι συγκαταραθμεῖσθαι (11a20-2).3

And some of the occurrences in EN are beyond suspicion, such as 1112a21, 22, and 1172a25.4 One finds in the Aristotelian corpus both authentic and inauthentic occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περὶ); further argument is required to sort the disputed sentence into one class or the other.

A more sophisticated argument might be based on the observation that many of the occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περὶ) in attested works are in sentences that are editorial in character, remarking about what has come

2 Stewart quotes Eucken’s study of the preposition in Aristotle, Ueber den Sprachgebrauch de Aristoteles: Im allgemeinen nun ist dies bei Aristoteles nicht häufig, in einigen Schriften, und zwar in der Ethik, Rhetorik und Topik, findet es sich öfter als in den andern (p. 47). However, with computer searches it is possible to be more precise. ὑπέρ (= περὶ) occurs with these frequencies in attested works: Ath. Const. (3); Cat. (1); EN (7); PA (2); Rhet. (8); De Sommo (1); Top. (6).

3 And, like EN 1156b15-6, it occurs in a passage that is parenthetical in character, namely 11a20-38.

4 The complete list of occurrences in EN is: I.v, 1096a4; I.vi, 1096b30; III.iii, 1112a20; III.iii, 112a21; IV.2, 112a33; VIII.1, 1155b16; and X.i 1172a26. II.2, 1104a13 and V.5, 1133b10 are borderline cases, which illustrate, at least, that the step to using ὑπέρ as περὶ was a natural one for Aristotle to take.
before, or what the nature of the present inquiry is, or what will come later. This is striking in EN, where 5 of the 7 occurrences are editorial:

1096a4-6 τρίτος δ’ ἔστιν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπέρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπισκόποις ποιησάμεθα.
1096b30-1 ἐξαιρεθέν τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἀν εἰθι φιλοσοφίας οἰκείωτερον.
1122b33-4 ὑστερον δ’ ὑπέρ αὐτῶν ἔρισθεν.
1155b15-6 ἐξηγεῖ τι δ’ ὑπέρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
1172a26-7 ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἡμῖν ἃν δοξεῖ παρετέθει εἰναι, ἄλλωστε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφιβολίαν.

And of the remaining 21 occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περί) in attested works, 6 are also editorial in character: Cat. 11a20; PA 692a20, 695a15; Rhet. 1403a35; De Somno 456b6; and Top. 104a32. What makes this even more remarkable is that, for Cat., PA, and De Somno, these editorial occurrences are the only occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περί) in those works. One might, then, hypothesize that these editorial passages, taken together, represent a later and harmonizing redaction of the manuscripts by someone other than Aristotle.

That they represent a later redaction is plausible, but there is no reason to think that the redactor is anyone other than Aristotle; for the editorial remarks cohere well with the text, they are generally acute and accurate, and one of them, as we have seen, is in the first person. I see no argument here for ruling 1155b15-6 to be spurious.

What seems to me the correct way to evaluate occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περί) takes its start from a remark of Burnet. Commenting on 1096a4, Burnet says that “Like Demosthenes, Aristotle uses ὑπέρ to avoid repetition of περί (cf. Sandys on Phil. i, § 1). We find it so used five times in the Ethics, viz. here and 1096b30, 1112a20, 1155b16, 1172a26 . . . There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the genuineness of passages where it occurs.”

Burnet’s remark suggests this rule of thumb: if there is some identifiable reason why Aristotle might use ὑπέρ rather than περί in a particular passage, then there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of that passage. Burnet gives one such reason: ὑπέρ might be preferred to avoid inegal repetitions of περί, as is seen frequently in Demosthenes.5 And in fact 17 of

5 Demosthenes uses ὑπέρ (= περί) both coupled with περί for the sake of rhetorical contrast (e.g. Olynthiaca 1,5,1-2, ἰδήν γάρ ἐστι τοῖς Ὀλυνθίους δι’ αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἄλλης δόξης οὖν ὑπέρ μέρους χώρας πολέμουσιν) and, more to the point here, simply for the sake of pleasing variety (e.g. De falsa legatione 94,4,3-5, βουλευομένων ὡς, οὖν περί τοῦ εἰ ποιητέων εἰρήνην ἢ μὴ (ἐδέδοκτο γάρ ἢ ἤτοι τούτῳ γε) ἄλλῃ ὑπέρ τοῦ πολλαν τινά).

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the 28 occurrences of ὑπέρ (= περί) are with περί nearby and can be accounted for in this way.6 Another reason concerns the different connotations of ὑπέρ and περί, the former suggesting an approach to something from above, the latter an approach to something on its own level. This would seem to be the reason why Aristotle sometimes uses ὑπέρ rather than περί in contexts that involve judgment and law.7 These contexts account for an additional 2 occurrences. And it might be for similar reasons that ὑπέρ (= περί) is sometimes used in editorial remarks that are methodological in character, ὑπέρ expressing better the metatheoretic viewpoint momentarily adopted.

Now in 1155b15-16 reasons of the sort just considered why Aristotle might prefer ὑπέρ over περί are operative, and thus “there is no reason to doubt the genuineness” of the passage. For περί is nearby; and because Aristotle is adopting a metatheoretic viewpoint, and is, moreover, referring to a prior verdict on a disputed logical point, ὑπέρ takes the sense of an approach to a subject from above. So ὑπέρ is an appropriate and not unaccountable word to find in this passage.

These points will become even clearer after we examine the second linguistic argument, which concerns the proximity of ὑπέρ αὐτῶν and περί αὐτῶν at b16-7. Grant puts the point this way: “these words [sc. ὑπέρ αὐτῶν] spoil the grammar of the sentence, as περί αὐτῶν is used in the next line with a different reference.” Stewart expands the argument: “for ὑπέρ αὐτῶν must be equivalent to περί τοῦ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦτον καὶ τὰ ἔτερα τῷ εἴδει, while περί αὐτῶν in the next line (b17) refers to τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη”. The argument, then, seems to be the following. Were περί αὐτῶν to occur in each of two successive sentences, it would be natural, if not necessary, to understand αὐτῶν to be referring to the same thing in each occurrence; whereas there would be a certain awkwardness and unclarity in having the reference for αὐτῶν change across the two occurrences. The use of ὑπέρ αὐτῶν at b16 as equivalent to περί αὐτῶν brings about this sort of awkwardness and unclarity, which is more charitably attributed to the misguided efforts of an interpolator than to a nodding Aristotle.

The proper answer to this argument, it seems to me, is to note that the reference attributed to a pronoun by a reader is highly dependent upon

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6 Add 1112a21 to Burnet’s list, and then Athen. Const. 4,3,3; both occurrences in PA; Rhet. 1377a25, 1396a26, and 1403a35; De Somno 456b6; Top. 104a32, 104a35, 116a5, and 116a7.

7 Athen. Const. 43,6,2; 44,3,2; and 57,2,4; and Rhet. 1377a25, 1396a26. Cp. Probl. 875a35, 951b9, 956b27.
context, and it is necessary to examine the particular case, to see whether
the author succeeds or fails at indicating the intended reference. Now
1155b13-16 is easily identified as a parenthetical remark by the reader: oĩ
μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἶόμενοι introduces a digression, and εἰρήται δ' ὑπὲρ ἀυτῶν ἐμπροσθεν intends, and succeeds, at bringing that digression to a
close. It is thus natural to read ὑπὲρ ἀυτῶν as having a referent within the
digression, and περὶ ἀυτῶν in the next line as referring back to a point
before the digression. Context leads the reader to attribute a different
referent to these similar phrases, even though they are in successive
sentences.

The difference in connotation between ὑπὲρ and περὶ also serves, in
this passage, to distinguish the referents of the pronouns they govern: ὑπὲρ
is used at b15 as referring to something already discussed and settled; περὶ
is used in the next sentence as referring to something at hand and open for
investigation. Similarly, the sentence in which the ὑπὲρ occurs is terse and
firm; that in which the περὶ occurs is tentative and exploratory; so that
one naturally looks for different referents for their respective pronouns.

Top. 104a33-7 provides an example of Aristotle's using ὑπὲρ together
with περὶ to help indicate a change of reference in a pronoun:

δήλον δ' ὅτι καὶ δειαλόεται κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ, διαλεκτικὴ προτάσεις
eisai teieh gavor ev tis ta doxouνta tois ὑπὲρ το突出问题 ἐπεσκεμένοις,
ois περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐν ἰατρικῇ ὡς ὁ ἰατρός, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ὡς ὁ
gewmetrikos  προφορὰς ἡμῶν ἐν ἐπί τῶν ἀλλῶν.

In this passage, ὑπὲρ το突出问题 is equivalent to ὑπὲρ τῶν τεχνῶν, whereas
περὶ . . . τῶν in the next line either has an indeterminate reference or is
equivalent to περὶ . . . τῶν doxouνtων. Note that here as well Aristotle
exploits the different connotations of the prepositions, using ὑπὲρ for the
relationship of examining a discipline, as from above, and περὶ for the
relationship of “having to do with” a discipline, as from around it.

The second linguistic argument fails, then, because there is no awk-
wardness or ambiguity in the proximity of ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν and περὶ αὐτῶν at
1155b16-7. The use of ὑπὲρ rather than περὶ at b16 is stylistically sound,
and it aids in clarifying the referent of the pronoun it governs. It provides no
grounds for considering b15-6 spurious. Let us then put linguistic concerns

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8 I think it most plausible to understand περὶ αὐτῶν as having a determinate reference,
and as referring to the difficulties about friendship raised in b9-13; but Burnet's remark
(ad loc.) that the phrase is “quite general. 'The subject may be cleared up.' ” needs to be
taken seriously. Note, however, that if we understand the phrase in this way, there would
be no difficulty at all concerning ambiguity of reference, and the second linguistic
argument cannot even get off the ground.

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aside and return to the argument from Vacuous Reference, for the case for inauthenticity rests on this.

**The Internal Arguments**

What is the logical issue that is raised by the parenthetical remarks at 1155b13-6? The answer to this question is found in the expression ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον, “admits of more-and-less”. Now τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον is an expression that is used in Plato and Aristotle to indicate variation in degree. For example, in the *Philebus* (24a-25a, cp. Phys. 189b10-6), Plato takes the presence of variation in degree to be a mark of the indeterminate or unlimited: “When we find things becoming ‘more’ or ‘less’ so-and-so, or admitting of terms like ‘strongly’, ‘slightly’, ‘very’, and so forth, we ought to reckon them all as belonging to a single kind, namely that of the Unlimited.” (24e-5a). And Aristotle describes various sorts of commonplace arguments (οἱ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον τόποι) that make use of variation in degree in the *Topics* (127b17ff, 137b14ff) and the *Rhetoric* (1358a14ff, 1397a12ff). But the phrase ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον is found, besides 1155b13-16, only in the *Categories*, where it is used to indicate, as in the *Philebus*, the possibility of comparative predication, Aristotle concluding that substance admits of it in one way and in another does not (1b33-4a8), that quantity does not (6a19-25), that some relatives do (6b19-25), some qualities do (10b26-11a14), and action and passion do (11b2-7). What Aristotle has in mind seems to be roughly this: to say that a category admits of more-and-less is to say that comparative predications within that category are possible. This view may be stated more precisely as follows. Consider a predicate ‘F’ in a category C; C admits of more-and-less if and only if either of the following conditions is fulfilled:

1. (i) for a single individual x at two different times t₁ and t₂, some claims of the form “x at t₁ is more (or less, or as) F as x at t₂” are either true or false;
2. (ii) for two individuals x and y at a single time, some claims of the form “x is more (or less, or as) F as y” are either true or false.

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9 It is important to understand 1155b13-6 in light of Aristotle's general procedure in the *Categories* and not only in relation to a single passage, as do Grant and Irwin. Grant refers us only to *Cat.* viii.36. Irwin remarks, concerning 1155b15-6, “These words are probably spurious; they may refer to *Catg.* 6b20-7.” Needless to say, it is arbitrary to select only one of the *Categories* passages as relevant.

10 Two things are comparable also if one is as F as the other. This case is usually omitted by Aristotle, but that he intends to include it is clear from ἡ ὁμοιως at *Top.* 107b13 and 17.
I adopt here the view that a category is a class, or kind, of predicate,\textsuperscript{11} so that a predicate “in a category C” is simply one that is an instance of that kind of predicate. Also, note that when either condition is fulfilled, a category admits of more-and-less because a predicate in that category does. Hence, these conditions are conditions of types of predicates admitting more-and-less. So, for example, because one individual can be darker than another, or a single individual can be darker than itself at another time, the predicate ‘dark’ admits of more-and-less, and, consequently, so does the category of which ‘dark’ is an instance, viz. quality.

The name of a category can itself by used as a predicate, as when one says of something or of a kind of thing that it is a relation, or a quality, or a substance. And it is in this way only that Aristotle allows that the category of substance admits of more-and-less: of the group. He says that, of individuals, species, and genera, individuals are most of all substances (2a11), and species are more substance than genera (2b7-21).\textsuperscript{12} But predicates in the category of substance do not admit of more-and-less.

Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man.\textsuperscript{13} For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less. (3b33-4a9).

We might, then, distinguish two ways in which something may admit of more-and-less. Let us call the way in which pale admits of more-and-less “Type I” variation in degree and the way in which substance admits of more-and-less “Type II” variation in degree.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} These kinds of predicates, however, correspond to kinds of existents, so that, roughly, true predication of a predicate in category C to an individual implies the existence of that kind of thing in the individual.

\textsuperscript{12} Note that since ‘species’ and ‘genera’ are relative terms, in the sense that the genus of one species can in turn be the species of another genus, there are many ‘degrees’ of substance, and the more general the genus, the less a substance it is.

\textsuperscript{13} I understand Aristotle’s position to be not that it is false to say “Jones is more a man than Smith” but that this claim has no truth-value. (It is not as though Jones is a man to the same degree as Smith.) The equality that human beings have and that is expressed in just states of affairs (EN V.1-2) is not a coincidence in degree of a characteristic, in the way that many tokens might have exactly the same intensity of a color.

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What is the difference between these two types of variation? Type I variation is grounded in comparative predications concerning individuals: it is because some individual is more F than another, or more F than itself at another time, that the predicate ‘F’ and the category C that ‘F’ is in “admit of more-and-less.” But Type II variation is not so grounded, because secondary substances are not individuals. “Socrates is more a substance than man is a substance” is not a comparative claim about individuals. The comparison seems to have its origin in theory rather than observation: in Type II comparisons, it seems, a comparison, or ranking, is first effected at the level of some higher kind, and then applied to lower kinds or, if possible, to individuals. In the case of substances, Aristotle first sets down the principle that one kind of substance is primary and others secondary, on the theoretical basis that the former “are subjects for everything else” (2b37-3a1) in the sense that “[i]f [they] did not exist it would be impossible for any other things to exist.” (2b)15 Then a species is said to be more substance than the genera under which it falls because it reveals the primary substances more, and, most importantly, because an analogy can be established of the form, primary substance: secondary substance:: species: genus. (2b7-22) Comparative claims about instances of these ranked kinds are then justified via these orderings. “Man is more a substance than animal” because: man is a species and animal is a genus, and species are more substance than genera because they are analogous to primary substances. The claim that “man is more substance than animal” is not established by inspecting human beings and other animals, or by comparing one’s humanity and one’s animality.

It is useful to have an example before us of how Type II variation might be extended to claims about individuals. Aristotle divides quantity into discrete and continuous quantity, not ranking these kinds (4b20-2). Suppose we were to adopt, hypothetically, the view that discrete quantity is primary, continuous secondary.16 Thus, although we might agree that there

14 I choose these inelegant labels in order not to prejudge any philosophical questions with a phrase. Donald Morrison, in an important discussion, refers to what I style “Type I” variation as variation “in intensity”, which seems accurate, but this then leaves us with the difficult task of finding a corresponding, non-controversial label for Type II variations: see “The Evidence for Degrees of Being in Aristotle,” Classical Quarterly 37 (ii) 382-401 (1987).


16 This is not an outlandish suggestion, given the theory of the continuum developed in
is no Type I variation in quantity and hence no true or false comparisons of that sort ("This three is more three than that three"), we would then allow comparisons of another sort. Looking at a group of three pennies, for example, and comparing them with three inches of a copper strip, we might say the former three was "more a quantity" than the latter. This claim would be true, not because of what we saw in the pennies and copper, but because the former is an instance of discrete quantity, the latter of continuous, and, by hypothesis, discrete quantity is more quantity than continuous quantity.

A second difference would seem to be that the predicate used in assertions of Type I variation must be applied synonymously to the two things compared—that is, the things compared must be synonyms\textsuperscript{17} but not in the second case. A Type I comparison such as "x is more F than y" can be expanded to "x is more F than y is F," which implies "x is F" and "y is F." The requirement of synonymy is the requirement that the predicate 'F' be used in the same way in each case. For in a Type I comparison the individuals compared need to have the same feature, and in the same way, for the comparative claim to be either true or false.

However, in Type II comparisons, the individuals or kinds compared are compared in virtue of a ranking or ordering of the kinds of which each is an instance. Of course these kinds could be related to each other as species under some common genus, in which case the characteristics shared by all members of that genus would be shared by all instances of the species of that genus, and then the things compared would be synonyms. For example, suppose that, among species of animal, the species man is primary and the others secondary. Then, given this theoretical ordering, a Type II comparative claim such as the following would be true "This man is more of an animal than that horse". This comparison implies "This man is an animal" and "That horse is an animal", and the predicate 'animal' is used synonymously in the two cases.

Yet it is not necessary that the kinds that are ranked be related as species under a common genus. If we take as fundamental his remarks about the analogy of primary substance and species (2b17-9), this would seem to be Aristotle's view of the relation of primary and secondary substance. His

\textsuperscript{17} Cat. 1a6-10. Aristotle speaks of things rather than words being homonyms, synonyms, or paronyms, and I follow this usage. Two things are synonyms if the same predicate can be truly asserted of each, where the reason why the predicate is asserted of the thing (the δ κατά τόθνμα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) is the same in each case. We could then say, derivatively, that in such a case the uses of the predicate were synonymous.
view would seem not to be that there is a genus, *substance*, of which *individuals*, on the one hand, and *species* and *genera*, on the other, are species, in the way that *man* and *horse* are species of *animal*. Rather, his view seems to be that species and genera are, as it were, *artificially* grouped together with individuals, because the way in which species are related to genera of that species is analogous to the way in which individuals are related to species, and, purely in virtue of this analogy, species in a sense *resemble* individuals and can be grouped with them. This resemblance is not observable but rather a consequence of the theoretical relationship expressed in the analogy.

Thus, whereas in a Type I comparison there must be a strict resemblance in the things compared, in the sense that they are synonyms, and they share a characteristic or set of characteristics on which the comparison is based, in a Type II comparison the resemblance can be indirect, because the kinds of which the things compared are instances have been brought into relation with each other theoretically, as, for example, by establishing an analogy. In such comparisons, the things compared are not synonyms.

It should be noted that, although we have been discussing Type I and Type II comparisons with respect to categories of predication, and different ways in which categories can admit variation in degree, the distinction we have drawn can be generalized, and the conditions we have mentioned applied to predicates apart from any concern about the categories to which the predicates belong.

Turning now to 1155b13-6, we are in a position to see that the logical issue raised there is, roughly, whether the possibility of making comparative claims about friendship implies that there is only one kind of friendship. Aristotle denies that this is so, and the preceding discussion indicates why: he allows two different ways in which something can "admit of more-and-less", and only one, that exhibited in Type I comparisons, implies that the things compared constitute a unified kind. For only in Type I comparisons is it the case that the things compared admit of comparison because they are synonyms and have shared characteristics.

According to this way of understanding the passage, Aristotle is not using the term *έτικος* in the technical sense of "species of a genus"; for, as we have noted, in this technical sense the term for the genus is predicated synonymously of all of the species under it, as well as of all of the instances of those species (cp. *Top.* 109b4-6, 123a29, 123a34, 126a17-20, 127b5-7). Rather, *έτικος* is used in a non-technical sense to mean something like "natural kind." This use of *έτικος* is common in Aristotle19 (and one finds a similar, non-technical use of *γένος*20). Clear examples of it in EN would
include 1145a16, 1174a16, 1174b5-6, and 1175a26-8. Thus, if the word is used in this way, to say that the things of which a term is truly predicated constitute a single εἴδος is to say that the term is predicated synonymously of them, in virtue of characteristics common among them; to deny this is to deny that the same word is predicated synonymously, in virtue of common characteristics. And applying the *Categories* definition of synonymy, we can say that, if things constitute an εἴδος in this sense, then the word for that εἴδος is predicated of those things according to a single λόγος. This is in fact the relationship between εἴδος and λόγος implicit in the discussion in EN I.6. There Aristotle expresses his view that τὰ γαθήν is not predicated παρά τὸν εἴδος by saying, concerning good things, that διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτης ἑνέγαθα (1096b24-5).

Now it is this very passage that, I believe, Aristotle is referring back to in VIII.1. But in order to see more clearly that this is so, it is useful to distinguish four different views, and two different sorts of confusion, which might be thought to underlie the remarks at 1155b13-16. The four views are the following:

1. "Comparability implies synonymy": If, when the same word is predicated of two things (or of one thing with itself at different times), comparisons can be made in the predication of that word, then the things of which the word is predicated are synonyms.
2. "Non-comparability implies absence of synonymy": If, when the same word is predicated of two things (or of one thing with itself at different times), comparisons cannot be made in the predication of that word, then the things of which the word is predicated are not synonyms.

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18 As Gauthier and Jolif remark, "*on ne doit pas entendre dans ce passage le mot «espèce» (εἴδος) au sense technique d'espèces d'un même genre: on aurait alors une notion univoque (la définition du genre se réalise identiquement dans les différentes espèces de ce genre, par example la notion d'animal est identique dans le cheval et dans l'homme), mais en un sens large et non technique."* (p. 669) The commentary of Gauthier and Jolif on 1155b14-15 is instructive, and, for the most part, they describe correctly the logical issue there raised, but they do not identify I.6 as the antecedent discussion, as I am maintaining here.

19 Bonitz' remark at 218a8-11 that — *peculiaris τοῦ γένους vis in eo cernitur, ut possit διαφέρονται εἰς εἰδή, τοῦ εἴδους, ut formae ac notiones unitae multitude indefinita contineatur* — indicates that "εἴδος" can be used prescinding from any relation to a γένος, whereas typically "γένος" cannot be used without implying the existence of εἰδή. Bonitz does not distinguish this as a separate use of "εἴδος"; however, many of the citations he gives at 218a43-61 are examples of it.

20 For example, in EN at 1095b26, 1140b4, 1145a27, and 1151b35.

21 And the view he is rejecting is expressed at 1096b21-2 as: τὸν τάγαθον λόγον ἐν ἀπασίν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεῖσθαι.
(3) “Variation in degree is not εἰδοποιών22: If two things differ in kind, then they
do not differ solely in degree of some characteristic or group of characteristics.
(4) “Difference in degree excludes difference in kind”: If two things differ in degree
of some characteristic or group of characteristics, they do not differ in kind.

Aristotle accepts (2) and (3) but rejects (1) and (4). (2) is affirmed at Top.
107b13-18:
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as more and less or as in like degree
(συμβλητά κατά τὸ μᾶλλον ή ὠμοίως), as is the case (e.g.) with a clear sound and a
clear argument, and a sharp flavour and a sharp sound. For neither are these things
said to be clear or sharp in a like degree, nor yet is the one said to be clearer or
sharper than the other. Clear, then, and sharp are homonymous. For synonyms are
always comparable; for they will always hold either in like manner, or else in a
greater degree in one case.

(3) is implied at Pol. 1259b36-8: “we cannot say that the difference is to be
one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in kind (εἰδεὶ διαφέρει),
and difference of degree is not difference in kind at all (τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
ὦττον οὐδέν)”. Also, the contrapositive of (3) is employed in PA 1.4 as a
methodological principle, at 644a17-19 and b11-16.

Aristotle clearly rejects (1) and (4), and I see no evidence that he ever
found either principle plausible. (1) is rejected in fragment 14 of the
Protrepticus, an early work:

‘More’ (τὸ μᾶλλον) is said not only according to superiority among those things for
which there is one account (καθ’ ύπεροχήν ὃν ἄν εἰς λόγος), but also according
to one thing’s begin prior and the other posterior (τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι τὸ δὲ
ὑπόπερ). For example, we say that health is ‘more good’ (μᾶλλον ὑγιεῖν) than the
things that pertain to health, and also what is in its own right naturally
choiceworthy than what is productive of this. And we see that one account (λόγον)
is not predicated of both useful things and of virtue, when we say of each that it is
good.23

Principle (4) is obviously false, for many things that differ in kind also differ
in degree in some respect.

“Those who think that there is one kind” at 1155a13-14 are philosophers,
probably Platonists,24 who affirm (1). Aristotle’s remark that they “have
22 That is, “constitutive of the kind.” The only occurrence in Aristotle (actually, the
masculine εἰδοποιῶς) is at EN 1174b5, though the term is common among the Greek
commentators.
23 Aristotle’s μᾶλλον ἀποδώσαμεν ὑπάρχειν τὸ λεχθὲν a few lines earlier expresses
nicely, I think, the way in which particular Type II comparisons are based upon a
theoretical ranking and are not observed in the things compared. For a full discussion
of this fragment, see Emile de Strycker, “Prédicats univoques et prédicats analogiques dans
24 See the remarks of Gauthier and Jolif at 1155b13. They note: “Ce sont certainement les
Platoniciens qui sont visés ici; sans doute a-t-on vainement cherché dans les Dialogues de
not relied upon an adequate sign (σμειον ἴκανόν)" should be taken to mean that such persons confuse the false principle (1) with the correct principle (2). In Aristotle, a σμειον ἴκανόν is a mark that alone allows one to draw a particular conclusion. 25 Non-comparability alone allows one to infer absence of synonymy, but comparability alone does not warrant the inference to synonymy, since in some circumstances comparisons among non-synonyms are possible.

Some commentators have focussed on (3) and (4) and have claimed that in 1155b13-16 Aristotle is criticizing those who affirm (4). "The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference," Burnet remarks; Aristotle believes that "difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον is not εἰδοποιόν . But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic" (p. 352). Stewart, citing Michelet, holds the same view (p. 270). Joachim's wide-ranging discussion concludes on a similar note: "All that we have here is the assertion that difference of degree and difference of kind are not incompatible" (p. 245). 26

The view that EN II.8 is the intended reference of 1155b15-16 is plausible, I think, only if it is assumed that Aristotle is concerned with rejecting (4). In II.8, Aristotle explains that, corresponding to each moral virtue, there are two vices, one involving an excess (ὑπερβολή), the other a defect (ἐλευθερία), in an emotion or kind of action. Since virtues and vices differ in kind, a moral virtue and its corresponding vices would be an example of things that differed in kind and also in degree.

Yet even on the assumption that Aristotle is concerned with (3) and (4) at the end of VIII.1, it is doubtful that the reference of that passage should be understood to be II.8. For, as was noted, it is obviously true that things can

Platon qui nous ont été conservés un texte qui formulerait expressément l'argument que critique Aristote; mais il est sûr que cet argument s'inscrit bien dans le prolongement de la théorie platonicienne de l'amitié telle que nous la font connaître notamment le Lysis et le Banquet; . . ."

25 Cp. the other three occurrences of the phrase: Meteor. 341a32; Phys. 222b22; Rhet. 1395a6.

26 Dirlmeier describes the mistaken view thus: Wenn wir an irgendeinem Phänomen Graddifferenzen beobachten, so bedeutet dies, daß ein Substrat da sein muß, an dem sie sich sozusagen abspielen . . . (p. 512). This seems correct, since it appears to be an ontological manner of stating (1); yet Dirlmeier departs from this focus by next citing a variety of passages (Phil. 24a7, PA 644a12-23, Pol. 1249b36-38) and concluding that Aristotle is vaguely referring to discussions of that sort: Wir . . . werden die Unbestimmtheit des Rückverweises um so eher in Kauf nehmen können, als die Hörer ja wußten: das ist bekanntes Gebiet.
differ both in kind and degree, and it would hardly be necessary for Aristotle to refer back to his discussion of moral virtue to illustrate the point. Nor could it be held that II.8 is useful for illustrating the truth of (3) as against the falsity of (4). For that chapter would be useful for that purpose only if it strongly emphasized—as it does not—the role of the ὃρθος λόγος in constituting the distinction between a virtuous action and the vicious excess or defect. For then it would be clear that it was not the mere ὑπερβολή or ἔλλειψις that was εἰδοποιῶν. 27

However, as we have seen, Aristotle is actually concerned with (1) and (2), and there is nothing in the discussion of II.8 relevant to establishing the latter against the former. In particular, one finds no use of comparative claims in II.8, of the sort that Aristotle uses to justify or illustrate the claim that something “admits of more-and-less.” Rashness is somehow characterized by excess, but Aristotle does not say that rashness is more rash than courage (for courage is not rash at all), or that rashness is more courageous than courage, or that courage is more a virtue, or less a vice, than rashness. 28 To the rash man, Aristotle says, the brave man seems a coward (not “less courageous”), to the coward he seems rash (not “more courageous”) (1108b19-20). Generally, it would seem that the use of ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις in II.8, as applied to emotions and actions, signifies Type I variation. When one asserts that one person is more afraid now than he was before, or that one person is more afraid than another, ‘afraid’ is being used synonymously to pick out the same condition in each. Thus the sort of variation that underlies moral virtues and vices is not the sort that gives rise to the logical issues mentioned at the end of VIII.1.

However, Aristotle’s remarks about goods in the opening chapters of EN do give rise to these logical issues, which are explicitly discussed in I.6. From the opening sentences of EN, Aristotle shows a concern with comparisons of goods that are not synonyms. After saying that καλὸς ἀπεφήναντο τάγαθον οὔ πάντ' ἐφεται (1094a2-3), 29 he immediately warns us that

27 It would seem that (3) implies that the doctrine of the mean cannot be understood as a rule for action, for then discovering the virtuous action could not be merely a matter of finding the right degree of something. Yet Aristotle is not concerned with arguing for this latter point in II.8. I myself tend to the view that the doctrine of the mean has a very limited role: it explains why there are two vices for each moral virtue, and it helps us in identifying those vices.

28 Aristotle does admit that sometimes a vice of one extreme is more like the virtue, either in its own right or because of our propensities (1108b35-1109a19). But he does not express this view using comparatives, nor does it seem that he could do so. (“Rashness is less a vice than cowardice” won’t work.)

29 A claim that could not constitute a “quantifier reversal” fallacy, as has sometimes been alleged, since Aristotle is not treating τάγαθον as an individual to be described (as
διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν (a3-4). And then, in the course of developing his argument concerning the highest good, he sets down various principles for comparing these different ends (and hence goods), among which are:

i) A product is better than the activity that produces it. (βελτίων πέρυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα) (1094a5-6)

ii) When one discipline has another within its scope, the good which is the end of the former is better than the good which is the end of the latter. (1094a14-16)

iii) If one thing is for the sake of another, the good of the latter is better than the good of the former. (1094a23 and 1095b29-30)

iv) The good of a group is better than the good of a member of that group. (1094b8-10)

This concern with comparisons among goods carries over into chapter 6, where the view that all goods are synonyms is criticized. It is true that nowhere in the chapter is the inference “goods are synonyms because comparisons of goods are possible” explicitly drawn and rejected. However, comparisons among goods are so important in the material that immediately precedes and follows I.6, that it is not implausible to conclude that it is the problem of the possibility of making such comparisons that motivates the discussion of I.6 and requires that the view there considered be rejected. Given that Aristotle allows that goods can be compared, the way in which he could show that the inference to the synonymy of goods is not necessary would be to show that goods are not synonymous, as he does in I.6.

Although the inference to synonymy from comparability is not explicitly drawn in I.6, it may in fact underlie the difficult passage at 1096a34-b5. The passage is as follows:

ἀποφήσει δ’ δὲ τὶς τί ποτε καὶ βουλονται λέγειν αὐτοκακόστων, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἤτοι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

ἡ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίκουσιν ἐὰν ὁ οὕτως, οὐδ’ ἢ ἄγαθὸν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄδικον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸν ἢσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυπρότερον τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

This passage can be understood as arguing that synonymy, far from underwriting comparability, in fact makes impossible the sort of comparative claims that those “who introduced the Ideas” (1096a13) wished to make, for if the idea of a kind of thing has the same λόγος as the members of that kind, then it cannot be better (μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸν) than members of that kind.30 For things are good with respect to what they essentially are (this is would have to be the case, for it to be within the scope of the quantifiers), but rather as a predicate whose general use may thus be adumbrated.

30 Note that at 1096b3-4 must be read as “more good” rather than “strictly good” or “good, rather”, because of the comparative λευκότερον used in the illustration at 1096b4.
assumed in the argument), but in this way the Idea and the members of the corresponding kind would not differ, hence neither would they differ with respect to goodness (εἰ δὲ οὐτως, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀγαθον). Nor could it be claimed that the Idea of a kind is better than the members of that kind simply because it is eternal (τῷ αἰώνιον ἐστὶν), for nothing has more of a characteristic (at some time) simply by having that characteristic (to some degree) forever. Thus, the sorts of comparatives that "those who introduced the Ideas" would like to make – i.e., those having the form "The Idea of F is better than a particular F") – are excluded, not underwritten by the thesis that the λόγος of each are the same. In brief, Aristotle's point is that, if the possibility of making comparative claims of the form "The Ideas are better than that of which they are ideas" implies that the Ideas and the things of which they are Ideas have one and the same λόγος, then it implies that the Ideas cannot be better – a contradiction.31

In sum, EN I.6 ought to be taken as the backward-reference of 1156b15-16, because there Aristotle argues against the view that goods are synonyms, which might be thought to follow from comparisons of goods, such as those Aristotle himself makes in the opening chapters of EN. And, as we have seen, this suggestion is confirmed by the kinds of expressions used in chapter 6 – for example, his assumption, in I.6 as in VIII.1, that unity of εἶδος and identity of λόγος are equivalent to synonymy – and by what is implicit in the argument of 1096a34-b5.

Significance of this result

That the end of EN VIII.1 refers back to I.6 is significant in at least three ways.

First, it suggests a new way of reading the beginning of I.7, namely, as an explicit formulation of criteria for comparing goods, given the fact that 'good' is not used synonymously. Often 1097a25-b21 is understood as a conceptual investigation of εὐδαιμονία;32 that is, it is understood to be an analysis arrived at in the case of a particular sort of good. However, since εὐδαιμονία is simply the "most good" of those goods attainable through action, it would seem that what this is could not be discovered or discussed

31 On this reading of the passage, τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν συνεικαστον (1096a34-5) should be understood as wondering how partisans of the Ideas would predicate τάγαθον of the Ideas: the Ideas must be better, but they cannot be if, in consequence of the comparison, they have the same λόγος.
without first setting down perfectly general criteria for comparing goods. And this is how, I suggest, we should understand Aristotle’s concern with whether or not a thing is more complete (τέλειον), self-sufficient (αοταρχεῖς), and choiceworthy (αλητόν): one thing is “more good” than another if it is either more complete, or more self-sufficient, or more choiceworthy. (Εὐδαιμονία is most good because it is most complete, most self-sufficient, and most choiceworthy.)

Because goods are not synonyms, comparisons of goods involve Type II variation. But this sort of comparison of individuals finds its justification in a ranking of those kinds of which the individuals are instances, and this ranking is achieved by ordering those kinds as regards completeness, self-sufficiency, and choiceworthiness. An example of how this might work is the following. Consider two pieces of brass pipe, the same in length, diameter, and quality of metal. Suppose that one is turned into a simple flute, by putting the appropriate sort of holes in it; the other is turned into a plumbing fixture, by threading the ends. Suppose, furthermore, that the labor – technical knowledge, time, physical force – required to make these changes is about the same in each case. The pipes before these changes were made were practically identical, and, if we consider them simply as pieces of brass, they are also very similar after the changes.

However, the changes serve to give a function (ξυγόν) to each pipe, and, in virtue of this, each pipe can be located in a kind. We might then reason that the flute-pipe is better than the plumbing-pipe, because the kind to which the former belongs, musical instrument, is better than the kind to which the latter belongs, plumbing fixture. This claim about kinds might in turned be justified in this way. One instrument is better than another if the activity for which the former is an instrument is better than the activity of which the latter is an instrument; but if one activity is more complete than another it is a better activity; music playing is more complete than plumbing, and hence better; thus a musical instrument is better than an instrument for plumbing.

This is simply an example, and nothing hinges on its details. The point is that comparisons of goods, since they involve Type II variation, will not be justified by observation of comparable characteristics but rather by a theoretical ranking of kinds, and that completeness, self-sufficiency, and choiceworthiness, on this interpretation, are criteria for arriving at this sort of theoretical ranking.33

33 That comparisons of goods take place via theoretical rankings helps to explain the Aristotelian notion that something that is better may accidentally be worse. For example, Aristotle says that pleurisy is worse than a stumble, even if it happens that a stumble
Note that the hypothesis that Aristotle is setting down general criteria for comparing goods in I.7 helps to explain why completeness, self-sufficiency, and choiceworthiness are brought into play later in the *Ethics* for goods other than εὐδαιμονία. For example, friendship διὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν is characterized, in contrast to the other kinds of friendship, as complete (1156b7-34), self-sufficient (1156b6-10), and choiceworthy (1157b26).

Second, Aristotle’s division of friendship into three kinds needs to be understood in light of the discussion of I.6. If ‘good’ need not be predicated synonymously, so that various kinds of goods do not necessarily fall under a larger kind, in the way in which species divide a genus, then the three kinds of good that are the basis of the three kinds of friendship – τὸ ἄγαθόν, τὸ ἥδον, τὸ χρήσιμον – likewise need not be united under a larger genus. Since friendship is divided into kinds according to the goods loved in a friendship (1156a6-10), it might be the case, then, that there is no overarching genus of which the three kinds are species. This would imply that there is no common characteristic that would be constitutive of friendship in all three cases, such as εὐνοία, as John Cooper has suggested. But, I believe, not only is it possible that the kinds of friendship should be understood in this way, a full comparison of VIII.2-3 and I.6 requires it. For it seems to be Aristotle’s view that friendship διὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν stands to the other kinds of friendship as a good in the category of substance stands to a good in the category of accident; yet goods in different categories, Aristotle tells us in I.6, are not synonyms (1096a17-29).

A corollary of this point is that, since I.6 is directed against Platonists, and since VIII.1 depends upon I.6, it would seem that at least the part of the books on friendship where he distinguishes the three kinds of friendship (VIII.2-5) was viewed by Aristotle as a rejection of and alternative to a Platonic understanding of friendship and love, according to which goods during a retreat means that a man is imprisoned or executed. (1138b1-5) Only the ranking of the kinds μὲν τῇ τέχνῃ (1138b2). Cp. 1094b14-19; and the notion of τὸ ἀπαθὸς ἄγαθόν at 1129b3-6.

Aristotle does not apply a word such as αὐτοχωρεῖ to friends διὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν, but his frequent comments that the goods of such friendships are within the friends themselves and not adventitious (which fact accounts for the stability of such friendships), seem to express a similar idea.


Friends διὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν are friends καθ’ αὐτοῖς (1156b9), friendships of the other two kinds are friendships κατὰ συμβεβηκός (1156a16-19).

and beautiful things are "homogeneous", as Martha Nussbaum has put it.\(^{38}\) Even if we agree with Anthony Price\(^{39}\) that the ascent passage of the *Symposium* should not be read as supposing or implying the homogeneity of beauty (and thus, presumably, of goodness), and thus there is no reason to attribute that view to Plato; nevertheless, it would seem, from VIII.1 read in the light of I.6, that followers of Plato understood the ascent passage in this way, and perhaps Aristotle even believed that Plato was in some sense philosophically bound to adopt that view.\(^{40}\)

Third, and finally, the connection between VIII.1 and I.6 here argued for is an indication of the unity of books I and VIII and thus, by transitivity, of any books in EN with which these form a unity. Moreover, the striking brevity of the remark at 1155b15-16 seems to imply that Aristotle is presupposing a sure familiarity with the earlier discussion and a confident grasp of its implications. And this point in turn suggests that some references and allusions in EN may be subtle and difficult to detect, so that they have hitherto gone unrecognized; furthermore, our recognizing them may in some cases depend upon our having recognized some other connection. To give an example: On the assumption that book I forms a unity with the entire discussion of friendship in VIII and IX, it becomes plausible to link together Aristotle’s *apologia* for criticizing his philosophical friends at the opening of I.6 (1096a1111-17) with his remarks in IX.1 about the importance of showing reverence and piety toward those with whom one has studied philosophy (1164b2-6): the latter remarks would require that something like an *apologia* be included in the earlier passage. It seems to me not unlikely that much of the evidence for the integrity of the *Ethics*, like this example, can be discerned only once it is appropriately sought\(^{41}\).

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\(^{40}\) However, one might argue that the infinitive εἰσαγαγεῖν in τὸ φίλους ἀνδρᾶς εἰσαγαγέων τὰ ἑδή at 1096a13 makes it more likely that Aristotle attributed this view to Plato as well as to his followers.

\(^{41}\) In preparing this paper I have made extensive use of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* on CD-ROM, together with the Pandora research program.